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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - SEPARATION AGREEMENTS - SUBSIS-
TENCE AFTER ISSUANCE OF COURT'S DEcREE.-During the pendency
of a separation action, plaintiff and her husband contracted whereby
he agreed to pay her 210 dollars per week until she remarried or died.
The parties stipulated that their agreement should only become bind-
ing from the date of the judicial decree of separation, and that it
should be incorporated therein. Subsequent to the court's separation
award, the defendant succeeded in having the decree modified, so
that the plaintiff's alimony was reduced to 160 dollars per week.
Plaintiff sued for the difference between the reduced amount awarded
by the court and the amount specified in the contract. Held, sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiff reversed. Before obligations under
a separation agreement and a separation decree can exist concurrently,
the contractual obligation must exist independently of the judicial
action taken. Murray v. Murray, 278 App. Div. 183, 104 N. Y. S.
2d 44 (1st Dep't 1951).
The validity of separation agreements entered into between hus-
band and wife after separation for legal cause has been repeatedly
recognized.' When these agreements include provisions for alimony,
the courts are inclined to adhere to the judgment of the parties re-
specting support except where fraud, duress, or inadequacy require
impeachment of such agreements.2  Since the prime concern of the
wife is to have some assurance that the alimony will be paid, these
agreements are frequently incorporated into the decree of the court,3
thereby exposing the recalcitrant husband to the judicial sanction
of contempt in case of non-performance. Such incorporation, how-
ever, does not prevent the court from modifying the judicial decree.4
In the event of a subsequent modification, a controversy often arises
as to whether the original terms of the contract still subsist, and are
enforceable by an action on the contract.
In determining whether the contract has an existence apart from
the judicial decree, the courts have repeatedly referred to the dictum
in Goldnun v. Goldman, 5 wherein it was stated that rights under an
agreement may survive modification of a decree, if such was the
manifest intention of the parties. 6 In the absence of invalidating
iGalusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 22 N. E. 1114 (1889); Clark v.
Fosdick, 118 N. Y. 7, 22 N. E. 1111 (1889).
2 Hungerford v. Hungerford, 161 N. Y. 550, 56 N. E. 117 (1900) ; Galusha
v. Galusha, 138 N. Y. 272, 33 N. E. 1062 (1893); Pomerance v. Pomerance,
271 App. Div. 1027, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 72 (2d Dep't 1947), aff'd, 301 N. Y. 254,
93 N. E. Zd 832 (1950); Almonte v. Almonte, 259 App. Div. 311, 19 N. Y. S.
2d 153 (1st Dep't 1940); cf. Everitt v. Everitt, 201 N. Y. Supp. 305 (Sup.
Ct. 1923).
3Wimpfheimer v. Wimpfheimer, 262 App. Div. 304, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 102
(1st Dep't 1941).
4 Kunker v. Kunker, 230 App. Div. 641, 246 N. Y. Supp. 118 (3d Dep't
1930).
5 282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. 2d 265 (1940).
3 "The direction of the court may be enforced in manner provided by
statute and the plaintiff may still resort to the usual remedies for breach of
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circumstances, therefore, subsequent New York cases have sustained
the terms of the original contract when the language has expressly
indicated such an intent.7 Thus, where a contract provided that the
provisions in any divorce decree should in no way affect the obliga-
tions imposed by the agreement, the court concluded that an inde-
pendent contract obligation existed.8 But where the language of the
agreement neither clearly nor expressly stipulated for the continuance
of the contractual obligations after the issuance of the judicial decree,
the courts have been reluctant to find that the parties intended such
a result by implication.9 Nevertheless, there has been some indica-
tion that the courts may find, from the general tenor of the entire
agreement, that the parties did not intend their contract to merge in
the judicial decree, but to exist concurrently therewith, even though
the parties had not expressly so provided.10
In the present case, no express provision for the subsistence of
the contractual rights was made, and the court apparently followed
those decisions which emphasize the reluctance of the New York
courts to imply such a provision. Since the agreement was to be
binding only upon the award of a judicial decree, the court concluded
that no concurrent obligation arose; rather there was a merger of
the agreement into the decree due to the dependence of the former
on the latter.
It is to be remembered that alimony provisions of a judicial de-
cree are abrogated by the death of either the husband or the wife or
by her remarriage.1 The agreement in the principal case provided
for the support until the wife remarried or died. Such language would
seem to indicate an intent to bind the husband's estate to a contrac-
tual obligation even though the judicial obligation would cease upon
the husband's death. Such intent, as manifested by the language of
the agreement, would have the effect of creating an agreement sep-
arate and apart from the judicial decree. Although the conditioning
of the agreement on the award of the separation decree postponed
a contractual obligation if there has been such breach, but we do not now decide
whether the parties intended that the contractual obligation of the defendant
should survive where the court has modified a direction to the defendant to
pay the sum fixed by contract." Id. at 305, 26 N. E. 2d at 269.
7 Wersinger v. Cook, 187 Misc. 1059, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1946)
(The contract itself stated that, "this agreement shall survive an action of
divorce.") ; cf. Bell v. Bell, 171 Misc. 605, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
("This agreement shall remain in full force and effect unless mutually modified
or cancelled.").
8 Holahan v. Holahan, 191 Misc. 47, 48, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 786, 787 (Sup. Ct.
1947), aff'd inem., 298 N. Y. 798, 83 N. E. 2d 696 (1949).
9 Jaeckel v. Jaeckel, 179 Misc. 994, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1943);
Chester v. Chester, 171 Misc. 608, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Matter
of Johnson, 185 Misc. 352, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 771 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
10 Matter of Van Arsdale, 190 Misc. 968, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 487 (Surr. Ct.
1947) ; see King v. King, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 865, 868 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
11N. Y. CIT. PRAC. Act § 1172-c; Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N. Y. 408, 75
N. E. 236 (1905).
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the effectiveness of the agreement until the decree was awarded, it
is submitted that the parties probably did not intend the same act
which gave life to the agreement to result also in its death.
M
FOREIGN CORPORATION-JURISDICTION BASED ON SINGLE TORT.
- A Massachusetts corporation negligently caused damage to the
plaintiff's house in Vermont while repairing the roof. The plaintiff
instituted an action against the corporation in Vermont by serving
process on the secretary of state. Such service was made pursuant
to a statute of that state which subjected to its jurisdiction a foreign
corporation which committed a tort within its borders.' The defen-
dant appeared specially and moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the statute was unconstitutional as a violation of due
process in that it made the commission of an isolated act a basis of
in personam jurisdiction. Held, motion denied. A state has the
power to subject to the jurisdiction of its courts by statute a foreign
corporation which commits a tort within its borders. Smyth v. Twin
State Improvement Corp., 80 A. 2d 664 (Vt. 1951).
The rudiments of due process require that a court, in order to
render an in personam judgment, must have jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. If such jurisdiction is lacking, the judg-
ment is void.2
Traditional concepts of due process permit jurisdiction to be
based on presence, 3 consent,4 or submission to the jurisdiction.5 The
presence of an individual defendant presents no difficulties since he
has an actual physical existence in the jurisdiction. However, a cor-
poration, being a creature of the law, presents a problem in that it is
deemed to have no existence outside the jurisdiction which gave it
life.6 Notwithstanding this concept of limited existence, a corpora-
tion is permitted to carry on its business in other jurisdictions through
agents.7 As a consequence, the corporation enters into a series of
IVT. STAT. § 1562 (1947): "If a foreign corporation makes a contract
with a resident of Vermont to be performed in whole or in part by either party
in Vermont, or if such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part
in Vermont against a resident of Vermont, such acts shall be deemed to be
doing business in Vermont . . . and shall be equivalent to the appointment by
such foreign corporation of the secretary of the state . . . to be its true and
lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions
. . . arising from or growing out of such contract or tort."
2 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1887).
3 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
4 Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 81 F. 2d 346 (7th Cir. 1936).
5 Simons v. Inecto, Inc., 242 App. Div. 275, 275 N. Y. Supp. 510 (3d Dep't
1934).
6 See Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28 (1900).
7 See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (U. S. 1839).
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